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Abstract
This article discusses the recent expansion and structural changes in the Turkish higher
education and analyses a number of economic consequences in terms of equity and returns
across regions. First, we outline the institutional background of the expansion in order
to identify various re-distributive dimensions of the policy. Using household labor force
surveys between 2004 and 2013, we explore whether college proximity affects local fami-
lies’ access to college. Our results show that this policy had an equity-enhancing effect for
daughters of low-educated households in some regions with large-scale expansion. Sec-
ond, we investigate whether the compositional change has affected local returns to college
degrees and contributed to the relative convergence across regions. The estimation results
show that despite the increase in college graduates, returns in terms of wages at the local
level has increased increasing and that some regional convergence was attained.
Keywords: Higher education ; Returns to Education;College Proximity; Turkey
JEL Classification: I23; I26; R23
1 Introduction
Institutions designing higher education have economically and socially significant effects by
determining and reproducing the selection mechanisms that match ability and rewards in a
society. The limited supply of higher institutions and the costs associated with access and
attendance are key factors helping to evaluate the degree of equality of opportunities and the
efficiency of higher education systems. Since the early 1970s (Hansen and Weisbrod, 1969), the
question of whether allocating more public resources to higher education is equity enhancing
or equity impeding has been widely debated. More recent discussion has focused on the
positive and negative selection of likely college attenders regarding educational expansion.
Choi (2015) studies the impact of expansion on college earnings in South Korea and finds that
the expansion has mostly benefited female compliers through human capital effect. Brand and
Xie (2010) find a negative selection effect of educational expansion in the US, indicating that
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those who are less likely to attend college benefit most from college. Blanden and Machin
(2004) discuss how higher education expansion in the UK has mostly benefited richer families.
To the degree that the expansion of higher education reaches a wider portion of society and
hence has a more egalitarian character with a more democratic contribution, it is likely that
the political landscape and competition will change in the long run. Iversen and Stephens
(2008), however, note that higher education seems less re-distributive than public investment
in primary and secondary education.
Higher education expansion in Turkey was initiated in 2006, with the number of public
universities more than doubling to 103 by 2014. Additionally, improved re-distributive grant
and accommodation policies increased higher education access rates from 15.7% in 2004 to
31.7% by 2012. Gender inequality in access to higher education substantially decreased and
regional gender disparities declined. Evaluating the policies associated with expansion at this
scale requires a better understanding of the political and institutional background, and more
attention to country-specific selection mechanisms related to higher education. Turkey’s higher
education institutions have the dynamic character necessary to keep up with contemporary
conditions of an emerging democratic society. The evolving need for institutional change in
higher education is thus a political issue since, to a certain extent, any modification requires
public consent regarding its economic and social consequences. Furthermore, the issue of
public finance for the burdensome costs of higher education has a re-distributive character. In
this study, we first provide a short history of Turkey’s higher education institutions and the
major changes that they underwent. We draw attention to the social and economic changes that
can be related to Turkey’s expansion of post-secondary education by providing an account of
the institutional background and complementary policies (grants and accommodation) related
to the expansion. Our main argument is that, since 2006, newly emerging universities have
expanded into relatively less developed regions, which has implications for regional economic
structures. We observe two major local labor market outcomes of this expansion, one is the
localization of labor force suggesting increased college access with proximity, and the other is
the convergence of relative returns to education across regions.
The structure of the this paper is as follows. The next section provides a brief economic and
political account of recent developments concerning the latest expansion of higher education
in Turkey and descriptive statistical evidence on various dimensions of the expansion. We dis-
cuss why investing in higher education is politically desirable in terms of capacity building and
local development. We argue that the new universities founded during the rule of the Justice
and Development Party (JDP)1 have contributed to local development via a re-prioritization of
public investments and demand externalities through increased public grants and accommo-
dation facilities targeting college students. In this sense, the expansion offers beneficial local
political windfalls as well as equality enhancing educational opportunities. It seems that this
policy shift will have long-term consequences that are likely to affect Turkey’s social and eco-
nomic structure. One important finding relates to improvements in gender equality in access to
1the JDP is the translation of the Turkish name for Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP)
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college, particularly in regions where the scale of expansion is greater. In the third section, we
focus on one of the re-distributive outcomes of the expansion. Using a difference-in-difference
model, we try to determine whether college proximity produces a redistributive effect and in-
creases access for local families. We find that local enrollment has increased for both boys and
girls following the capacity increase in new universities, particularly for new universities in
eastern regions where the expansion is larger. When the intergenerational (paternal education)
effect is included, we find that for girls, low-educated households have benefited more from
college proximity. The fourth section discusses the impact of the increased numbers of college
graduates on relative returns to education. Regional estimates of wage regressions before
and after the expansion show that there is a convergence in terms of the marginal returns of
graduating from college.
2 Investing in Higher Education
During its relatively long tenure in government, the JDP has shown its willingness to expand
higher education and improve access in favor of its electorate at the time of the expansion,
but without paying much attention to the lagging changes in institutional structure. Investing
in post-secondary education and opening new universities yields development and economic
rents besides political and social ones. Firstly, the institutional framework of budgetary ex-
penditure encourages central governments to pursue large-scale public investment at the local
level.2 This large-scale expenditure is financed through central government grants and exe-
cuted via governors (local appointees of central government) while Turkey’s local governance
system gives only very limited appropriations to mayors, who are the only elected local au-
thority at the provincial level. In this respect, the local spending-revenue balance depends
mostly on political maneuvering in order to address locals’ demands for easier access to higher
education. This political intermediation gives more weight to pork-barrel/patronage politics,
which in turn makes central government a key actor for the provision of local public goods.3
Besides serving to secure higher social status, tertiary education in Turkey has also been
valued as a means of upward mobility in income and lifestyle. Low average education levels
and limited access to higher education justify social aspirations related to the importance
of being educated. Table 1 illustrates the relationship between intergenerational educational
mobility and income as of 2007. Column 1 in Table 1 indicates average positioning of education
pairs of two generations (Father and Adult) according to quintiles of the income of the adult.
Column 2 is the average transition of intergenerational education pairs. The earnings’ gap
between different education levels which is measured by average positioning according to
the quantiles of income (5 highest, 1 lowest)) implies that better-educated people have higher
2Turkey remains one of the few OECD countries where public finance is mostly centralized (Blöchliger and
Rabesona, 2009).
3As an interesting case, Özcan (2006) discusses the issue of large-scale local spending around three development
projects. One of them is a local industrial project (military tank production) that the local university, Erciyes Uni-
versity, participated in for the province of Kayseri, Özcan (2006). Initiated with the approval of central government,
it failed due to the inability of local political groups and the central authority to coordinate.
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returns. In terms of intergenerational effect, having an educated father slightly increases
average income positioning (column 2). Table 1 depicts the impact of the father’s education
level on the social inheritance which affects children’s education. On average, most adults
attain the same education level as their father. Strikingly, for the highest (college) and lowest
(less than secondary) education levels, the probabilities of children matching their father’s
education level are very close, at 66% and 68% respectively. Table 1, however, only presents a
partial picture for the institutional backgound of the intergenerational mobility. Higher social
aspirations have led to the creation of different new social and political institutions which
aimed at overcoming the barriers linked to college access.4 We will provide a brief discussion
in the next section.
2.1 Political and Institutional Background
In order to understand how students sort at post-secondary level in Turkey, we have to give a
brief history of university entrance procedures and its evolution. We will focus on major factors
affecting the selection mechanism and higher education expansion. One major change is related
to the conduct of the entrance exam, which determines the competition among students and
private provision. The second important aspect is the relationship between political interests
and the evolution of the public university system. Third, we discuss institutional restrictions
and political interventions in the system, and their relevance for the inclusion of social groups.
Until 1974, the selection mechanism was not centralized, being left to the discretion of
universities. A standardized system was then implemented5, with a central exam that was
intended to offer fairer evaluation for students. This change in selection narrowed the higher
education gap between social groups having different socio-economic backgrounds. However,
substituting the former with a more standardized evaluation has encouraged competition
among students, which entails preparation for the central entrance exam. In this competitive
system, households need extra resources to send their children to better high schools and/or
private tutoring classes (dershane).6 Berberog˘lu and Tansel (2014) show that the demand for
private tutoring is higher among parents having higher education levels and who more likely
to have the resources. Thus, in terms of mobility and inequality, the central entrance exam has
posed a challenge for disadvantaged social groups.7
The selection mechanism governing the transition from high school to post-secondary level,
and the rules and regulations within universities have undergone major changes. Following
the military coup in 1981, the higher education system fell under the control of a centralized
institution and began to operate under the supervision of the Council of Higher Education
(COHE). 8 Until 1984 (except for few short-lived private higher education institutions in the
4The 1980s and 1990s witnessed growing institutional investment by the so-called conservative social class or
the periphery (with the social cleavage termed by Mardin (1973)).
5http://www.osym.gov.tr/belge/1-2706/tarihsel-gelisme.html
6Tansel and Bircan (2006) report that families spend more than 1.4 per cent of GDP on private tutoring in Turkey.
7For example, the provision needed for private tutoring has led to private provision supported by conservative
groups and networks.
8CoHE (YÖK) was designed by the military coup in a way that allowed it to involve itself in staff recruitment
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Table 1: Intergenerational Educational Mobility and Average Income Positioning
Adults
Less than Secondary Secondary Post-secondary
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Father Less than Secondary 2.32 0.68 3.13 0.24 4.23 0.08
Father Secondary 2.82 0.13 3.31 0.46 4.24 0.42
Father Post-secondary 2.57 0.04 3.59 0.30 4.38 0.66
Source: Author’s calculations based on 2007 Adult Education Survey (AES), include adults aged 25 years or above.
(1) Average score or positioning according to income quantiles (5 highest, 1 lowest). For example, the adults who have attained secondary
education level as their father have an average income score of 3.31 on a scale of 1 to 5.
(2) Education level conditional on father education. The rows add to one across father’s education level.
mid-70s), the university system was entirely dominated by public universities. A new type of
private (but non-profit institution or vakif) university appeared when legal restrictions were
lifted in 1984. For the public universities, meanwhile, there were two waves of proliferation
(Figure 1). In the first wave, in 1992, twenty-two new universities were founded under the
rule of a coalition government between the center-right (True Path Party -DYP) and center-left
(Social Democratic Populist Party - SHP) parties. After this first wave, while the number of
public universities did not increase further, private (vakif) universities continued to boost. By
2006, there were seventy-seven universities, of which twenty-four were privately owned. In
2006, the JDP accelerated the creation of new public universities, mostly in Anatolia. The
introduction of private universities provided easy access to tertiary education at a cost that was
particularly affordable to wealthier families.9 Since 2006, the number of public universities has
nearly doubled to one hundred and three.10
The expansion policy carries a political motive to promote the local development policy
(Arap, 2010) and to facilitate demand shift at the local level. Local interest groups show political
support with the argument that new universities trigger higher local demand externalities. It
is a way of importing demand for small cities that lack a large industrial sector. The choice
of location may depend on various factors.11 For example, McLendon et al. (2009) find strong
empirical evidence that, independent of other factors, partisanship, legislative professionalism,
term limits, interest groups and gubernatorial power influence appropriation levels.
In the late 1990s, increasing political conflict between secular and conservative parties led
to a number of restrictive regulations likely to affect inclusion based on educational equity and
mobility. In 1997, a social and political agenda to redesign the education system was dictated
to the coalition parties (True Path Party and Welfare Party12) by the military wing of the
National Security Council (NSC). There were two major restrictions imposed on the selection
mechanism. One involved a new design that subjected religious vocational school graduates
(RVS-imam-hatips) to a reduced exam score coefficient, thereby reducing their total scores in
policy, control budgetary decisions and regulate university elections.
9In contrast to public ones, most private universities accept students with lower scores in the entrance exam.
Until 2006, private universities were located in two major cities, Istanbul and Ankara. In that sense, opening a
private university in a relatively poor region seems to have less economic motivation.
10Altinsoy (2011) argues that emerging universities are less effective in terms of quality.
11Arap (2010) reports that political preferences were a major factor behind behind the proliferation of universities.
12A center-right and Islamic party coalition.
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Figure 1: Evolution of Higher Education Institutions (number of establishment by year)
Source: Statistics of Higher Education Council
the university central exam. The rationale behind the coefficient factor that disadvantaged RVS
graduates in entering (or choosing) university faculties other than theology was to discourage
families from sending their children to religious schools if they wanted access to all options in
post-secondary education. This intervention in the selection process reduced the enrollment
rates for RVS, with the number of students decreasing from 511,502 to 77,392 between 1997
and 2002 (Ozgur, 2011). Another NSC intervention related to the regulations dictated to the
CoHE was the reinforcement of the headscarf ban for female higher education students, which
had previously been left to the discretion of the authority of each university. The official
prohibition on the headscarf was not limited to universities but applied to all employees
in all public sectors as well.13 These restrictions meant that children with conservative (or
religious) family backgrounds faced a number of obstacles in accessing higher education. The
challenges were especially demanding for girls, starting at high school and even continuing
during their working life, such as in the public sector where women are concentrated.14 Their
job opportunities were limited to the private sector, which has a smaller share in less developed
small cities than the public sector. The political aim to unwind these disadvantages was barely
expressed or debated publicly following the JDP’s first general election victory in 2002. The
JDP’s political discourse seemed to be vaguely involved in these claims publicly, while the
university headscarf ban was relaxed by a decree in 2007, no constitutional changes were made
until the referendum in 2013. Meanwhile, the imposition of different coefficients for RVS ended
in 2010 so that the entrance scores were thereafter based on a standard evaluation for students
from all high school types.
13The rule that women wearing a headscarf were not allowed to become public servants dates back to a circular
issued by the Republican People’s Party in 1978 (Bayram, 2009). The regulation remained in force after the 1980
coup d’Etat.
14Lawyers, and doctors and school teachers in the public sector were barred from wearing head scarves.
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2.2 Redistribution and Regional Development
In this institutional setting, specific to the Turkish system, where central government is the
major decision maker in public expenditure, closing the welfare gap between regions by offering
more budget/grant allocations seems to be a lucrative policy. However, it is important to note
that this strategy depends on expected, if not existing, electoral support for the governing party
at the regional level. Regionalisation of the political landscape, which is a common finding in
the voting literature on Turkey (Tezcür, 2012), and economic voting motives (Bas¸levent et al.,
2005) give further political rationale to the JDP’s grant allocation policy. Several papers have
discussed the role of central government within Turkey’s development perspective. Özcan
(2006) suggests that devolution does not provide a clear solution to the regional development
problem, arguing that a centralized government can enhance equity and efficiency more than
a decentralized can. Luca and Rodríguez-Pose (2014) recently claim that under the JDP rule
between 2004 and 2012, public investment was motivated by socio-economic principles rather
than political motivation, confirming the regional welfare gap argument. They explain this
finding using the strong developmental state capacity of the Turkish bureaucracy. Ultimately,
the basic question is whether public goods are allocated on an equity basis. Further study is
needed to identify the nature of such a policy with micro data (pork-barrel politics rather than
patronage networks, which are hard to capture without micro-data). In Greece, for example,
Rodríguez-Pose et al. (2015) find that public funds are allocated in favor of pork-barrel politics
rather than according to principles aiming at reducing regional disparities.
Table 2: Reprioritization and Share of Public Universities*
Budget shares of universities (grouped according to establishment year)
Years All Before 1992 Between 1992-2006 After 2006
(1) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
1990 4.12 4.12 1.00 - - - -
1991 3.96 3.96 1.00 - - - -
1992 4.32 4.32 1.00 - - - -
1993 3.70 3.40 0.92 0.30 0.08 - -
2000 2.68 2.06 0.77 0.62 0.23 - -
2005 3.40 2.53 0.74 0.87 0.26 - -
2006 3.09 2.27 0.73 0.81 0.26 0.02 0.01
2007 3.18 2.27 0.71 0.81 0.26 0.10 0.03
2008 3.24 2.15 0.66 0.87 0.27 0.22 0.07
2009 3.34 2.14 0.64 0.84 0.25 0.36 0.11
2010 3.51 2.15 0.61 0.84 0.24 0.53 0.15
2011 4.15 2.58 0.62 0.95 0.23 0.62 0.15
2012 3.94 2.32 0.59 0.90 0.23 0.72 0.18
Source: General Directorate of Budget and Fiscal Control. Last accessed on 22/06/2015 http://www.bumko.gov.tr/EN,2679/
budget-figures-and-budget-realizations.html
* Based on year of foundation
(1) The share of year-end expenditures in the Consolidated Central Budget.
(2) Figures show the composition of public funding allocated to universities grouped according their foundation years. The
rows add to 100 %.
Investing in higher education in small cities and funding universities only represent a
limited part of public expenditure. We should note that public expenditure in Turkey related
to higher education has a separate budgeting procedure, which is not reported as grants from
7
central government to local authorities.15 Table 2 displays changes in the budget share of
total expenditure of public universities in the consolidated budget. It shows that each wave
of expansion has changed the composition of public expenditure devoted to universities. The
share of universities in the central government budget has stayed at a level around 3-4% (Table
2, column 1), which is fairly stable despite the expansion of capacity with new universities.
Table 2 provides evidence that public funds were reallocated in favor of new universities in
each wave. Column 2 in Table 2 shows the composition of the year-end budget allocated to
universities according to our periodization of expansion. Over nearly two decades, the budget
share of universities founded before 1992 declined to 59% while newly established universities,
located mostly in small cities, increased their funding. The latest figures show that almost one
fifth of the total university budget was spent on universities established under the JDP rule.
15Local authorities are not entitled to finance major development projects through their own budgets without the
approval of the central government.
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Table 4: Higher Education Credit and Hostels Institution Statistics
Public Student Dormitories Number of Students Total Amount of
(No. Of Beds) accessing various public scholarships various scholarships (Thousand Turkish Liras)
Years Girls Boys Total Grant Credit Fee Waiver Grant Credit Fee Waiver
2002 105,247 82,940 188,187 - 451,550 405,791 - 495,664* 124,477*
2003 106,390 83,357 189,747 - 494,070 428,270 - 362,776 73,342
2004 109,168 83,193 192,361 54,724 522,670 459,595 49,348 533,982 93,917
2005 111,898 84,436 196,334 98,110 537,031 481,011 123,570 680,059 113,389
2006 115,190 85,226 200,416 135,497 569,276 505,348 204,167 844,551 124,614
2007 117,441 86,290 203,731 168,923 572,552 451,842 298,532 961,674 127,171
2008 121,316 88,041 209,357 181,490 578,009 466,492 320,823 1,036,282 129,671
2009 132,089 93,024 225,113 198,707 587,131 474,792 375,601 1,213,653 141,242
2010 146,680 99,840 246,520 234,130 611,903 478,601 525,627 1,335,320 152,909
2011 159,866 107,180 267,046 320,912 592,582 494,024 804,125 1,646,005 159,366
2012 187,356 118,022 305,378 348,904 667,359 509,801 1,021,217 1,942,806 162,684
2013 188,920 116,954 305,874 395,679 706,512 ** 1,205,588 2,250,046 **
2014 231,588 136,374 367,962 363,233 872,063 ** 1,173,468 2,936,490 **
Source: General Directorate of Higher Education Credit and Hostels Institution. Annual Reports (2014, 2010,2009)
* Cumulative sum between 1962-2002
** By the year 2013, Public university tuition fees are abolished for all students.
In addition to budget allocation, we need to give the scale of expansion at regional level.
Table 3, which shows the evolution of higher education enrollment by NUTS2 regions, reveals
several trends. Firstly, the total number of students enrolled, including private universities,
more than doubled from 2004 to 2012 to reach almost 2.5 million students. Secondly, the
post-secondary education age-population has gradually fallen by around 0.5% each year. The
combined effect of expanding capacity and declining age population resulted in a remarkable
increase in total enrollment rates (Table 3, last row).16 Although the situation in terms of
regional share in enrollment is less visible, peripheral provinces have undoubtedly benefited
from the expansion of higher education. Ankara, the capital province, and Istanbul lost
around 3 percentage points while eastern provinces more than doubled the number of enrolled
students compared to 2004. The expansion not only favored less-developed eastern provinces
but markedly changed the gender composition of enrollment between 2004 and 2013 in favor of
females, as indicated in the final two columns of Table 3. The gender gap closed in all regions,
with the ratio of females pursuing higher education increasing to 46% since the expansion wave
that started in 2006. Lastly, Table 3 shows that distance education also has become important,
particularly since 2008, reaching almost equal weight with traditional education. Comparing
Tables 2 and 3, we can argue that despite the relative increase of funding for new universities,
the government seems to have increased the burden of existing universities in terms of the
number of students enrolled.17
The JDP has adopted several practices to accompany its expansionary policy. Higher edu-
cation credit and grant coverage has increased significantly at every level, including graduate
studies. In line with this, accommodation facilities for students have been improved, partic-
ularly since 2010, with the involvement of the Housing Development Administration (TOKI),
which officially undertakes public housing investments. .18
Table 4 displays the public policies facilitating local accommodation for students from
16Note that there was no significant supply pressure from secondary level graduates that would have stressed
access to higher education during this period.
17For example, total number of enrolled students in Istanbul has increased from 143,095 in 2006 to 210,867 in
210,867.
18Law no. 6082 dated 25.11.2010. http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2010/12/20101210-1.html
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Table 5: Enrolled College Students* as % of Working Population** (NUTS2 regions)
Ratio of Enrolled Students*** (% of population 15-65)
2004 2006 2009 2010 2011 2012
Istanbul 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.3
Edirne-Tekirdag˘-Kırklareli 3.3 3.4 4.4 4.9 5.5 6.0
Balıkesir-Çanakkale 3.7 4.4 5.1 5.6 6.2 6.7
Izmir 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.7 3.9
Denizli-Aydın-Mug˘la 2.8 3.5 4.2 4.2 4.5 4.9
Manisa-Afyon-Kütahya-Usak 3.2 4 5.2 5.4 6.0 6.7
Bursa, Eskis¸ehir, Bilecik (Open University) 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.7 4.1 4.2
Kocaeli-Sakarya-Düzce-Bolu-Yalova 4.7 5.7 6 6.1 6.5 6.9
Ankara 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.7 4.9
Konya-Karaman 4.5 5.3 5.4 5.3 5.6 6.0
Antalya-Isparta-Burdur 3.4 4.0 4.6 4.9 5.5 6.0
Adana-Mersin 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.8 3.0
Hatay-Kahramanmaras-Osmaniye 1.7 1.8 2.4 2.5 2.8 3.0
Nevsehir-Aksaray-Nig˘de-Kırıkkale-Kırsehir 4.3 4.5 5.4 6.0 7.2 7.9
Kayseri-Sivas-Yozgat 3.3 3.7 4.4 4.8 5.4 6.0
Zonguldak-Karabük-Bartın 2.6 2.9 3.7 4.3 5.5 6.8
Kastamonu-Çankırı-Sinop 2.9 2.9 3.3 3.8 4.6 5.4
Samsun-Tokat-Çorum-Amasya 2.2 2.5 3.2 3.5 4.0 4.5
Trabzon-Ordu-Giresun-Rize-Artvin-Gümüshane 3.0 3.4 4.6 5.1 5.9 6.6
Erzurum-Erzincan-Bayburt 5.5 5.6 7.1 8.4 10.1 11.5
Kars-Ag˘rı-Ig˘dır-Ardahan 1.7 2.4 2.9 3.2 3.4 4.1
Malatya-Elazıg˘-Bingöl-Tunceli 3.5 3.6 4.1 4.7 5.4 6.3
Van-Mus-Bitlis-Hakkari 1.4 1.7 2.1 2.4 2.6 2.9
Gaziantep-Adıyaman-Kilis 1.1 1.4 2.2 2.5 2.9 3.1
Diyarbakır-Sanlıurfa 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.2
Siirt-Mardin-Batman-Sırnak 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5
* Source: TurkStat Regional Statistics last accessed on July 6 2016,
(http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/Bolgesel/anaSayfa.do).
** Source: TurkStat Household Labor Surveys (2004-2012). Population figures are calculated using factor weights.
*** The ratio is obtained by dividing the total number of enrolled students and population aged between 15-65.
other regions. Taken together, Tables 3 and 4 show a remarkable increase in female access
to, and enrollment in new universities. Dormitory facilities are particularly important for
female students from conservative family backgrounds. By the end of 2012, nearly 1.5 million
students gained access to education credits, grants or fee waivers.19 In 2013, university fees were
abolished for all students. We should note that, without changing the selection mechanism,
which favors students whose parents can afford better high school quality (Caner and Okten,
2013) and private tutoring (Berberog˘lu and Tansel, 2014), increasing subsidies to the system
can not guarantee equity of access to higher education.
It is also worth noting that the increased demand for housing facilities from students must
have put pressure on rental prices, which benefited rentiers. Non-pecuniary externalities
might include certain service sectors emerging within these districts due to increased demand.
It seems that this policy has attracted some complaints from local residents, whose concerns
were echoed by the prime minister in claiming that mixed-gender student accommodation was
against conservative values. As a result, female-only dormitories have increased to match the
growing demand. Table 4 shows that, from 2009 to 2014, significant progress was made to
increase the capacity of female dormitories, with the number of beds increasing by 100,000 in
five years.
Increasing enrollment and investment in higher education can further contribute to local
development by promoting domestic demand. The left-hand side of Table 5 displays total
enrolled public university students as a percentage of the working population of provinces. The
fact that in some regions total enrollment has increased far more than the working population
19University fee waiver and grants are means-tested and based on parental income level.
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reveals the contribution of demand created by this increased capacity. Among other factors
that would affect regional growth rates, in eastern provinces, we note that demand externalities
can contribute to economic activity through service sector growth.
Although the coverage of higher education has expanded, the question remains as to
whether these improvements have produced more equal opportunities. Previous studies
have found that the re-distributive effect of subsidizing higher education is very limited. For
Turkey, Caner and Okten (2013) , using special data from the central entrance exam of 2002,
showed that socio-economic background (parental income and education) is an important
factor in predicting student success. They conclude that subsidizing post-secondary education
(through a low public fee policy) mostly benefits students from higher income and better
educated families. Contrary to other countries with similar central entrance exams and dual
(public and private) university systems (Rozada and Menendez, 2002; Liu et al., 2006), Caner
and Okten (2013) find that students from higher income families in Turkey have a higher
probability of enrolling in private universities.20 It is probable that these higher returns from
post-secondary education constitute a strong incentive for families. We have to note that
enhanced access, accommodation and grants specific to post-secondary education challenge
existing social networks through public provision.21 We should also mention that economic
rents related to private provision may be weakened by public provision through a crowding-
out effect. Thus, new local political rents will probably emerge around the local organization
and provision of public services related to post-secondary education.
3 Proximity Effect and College Access
Expansion in higher education and increased university accommodation and grants facilities
are expected to increase mobility in terms of access. We can identify two channels that are likely
to affect the outcome of the expansion. The cost effect of access, which operates through income
is important in terms of inequality, particularly for students with poor family backgrounds.
Although the supply and capacity of higher education has increased during the expansion,
the costs associated with residing away from home may be unaffordable for certain families.
Thus, the income effect can modify college preferences, with proximity to a college being
likely to increase enrollment of local students through this channel. For the US, Turley (2009)
argues that college proximity facilitates the transition to college for families, both financially
and emotionally. Turley (2009)’s findings also support the fact that students from a lower
family income background are more likely to attend a nearby college. She concludes that
proximity helps to increase college enrollment of locals, particularly for less well-resourced
20The importance of private tutoring can partly explain the income channel in student success, Berberog˘lu and
Tansel (2014).
21For India, Iyer et al. (2014) argue that insurance provided by religious networks extends to non-religious service
provision, and these services, which mostly cover education and health, compensate for poor public provision.
Similarly, Hungerman (2005) finds a crowding-out effect for the state welfare provision program on church-funded
services in the US. We can argue that in Turkey, political welfare redistribution, which is becoming more universal
(e.g. in health and education), will inevitably crowd out private provision. An example of crowding-out can be the
increased capacity of dormitory facilities, which will increase public provision.
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families. The second channel might be related to cultural values, which mostly concern female
students and their families. Regarding the preferences of Hispanic students to attend nearby
colleges, for example, Desmond and Turley (2009) argue that attitudinal familism (a strong
sense of attachment to family members) can be a motive besides socio-economic factors. As
already discussed, female college enrollment increased dramatically in Turkey during the
2006 expansion (Table 3). We can argue that proximity is likely to affect the increased share
of female students through channels that are hard to identify with our data. In the US,
Riegle-Crumb (2010) shows that both Hispanic and white females have higher enrollment
rates than their male peers due to stronger academic performance and more academically
oriented social relationships or networks. If we assume that, in the poorer regions of Turkey,
more conservative families are unwilling to send their daughters to distant cities, it is possible
that college proximity serves as an incentive for local residents.
In order to understand how higher education expansion has affected the access of local
students at the regional level, we use data from yearly cross-sections of the Household Labor
Force Surveys (HLFS) between 2002-2013, which give detailed information at the NUTS2 level.
We specifically focus on whether students of poorer local families have benefited from college
proximity at the regional level during the transition from high school to college. We construct
a probit model in which the year dummy (pre-expansion and post-expansion) captures the
effect of college proximity, while paternal education level will proxy for the income effect.
Specifically, 2004 or 2005 are taken as the pre-expansion period while 2012 or 2013 are taken
as the post-expansion years.22 We take lower-than-secondary education level as a proxy for
family income. Equ. 1 gives the specification:
Pr(PSi,t = 1) = φ
(
β1Fi,t + β2Ti,t + β3Fi,t ∗ Ti,t) (1)
where φ is the cumulative distribution. The dependent variable PSi,r,t is a dummy variable
with the value 0 if the child is aged between 18 and 25, completed secondary school but did
not proceed to post-secondary level, and 1 if the child is aged between 18 and 25, completed
secondary school and enrolled in a post-secondary institution nearby. The subscripts indicate
year t. Fi,t is a dummy variable with the value 1 if the father of the child completed secondary
or post-secondary education and 0 if he has a lower education level. Coefficients β1 and β2
indicate paternal education and year effects. We ran separate regressions for each NUTS1
regions. In each estimation, we were interested in the sign of the coefficient β3 which will
capture the interaction between the effect of paternal education and the year effect.
Table 6 displays the results of the probit estimation. The model incorporates two main
effects (income and year) while the interaction term captures the post-expansion effect on
family income (paternal education). The results show that coefficients β1 and β2 are mostly
positive and significant across regions. However, we observe no significant and negative
impact of the interaction term for the male sample, which implies that proximity has no impact
22The choice of treatment year mostly does not change the sign of the effects. The regression tables with different
years are available upon request.
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on the attendance of students whose father has a less-than-secondary education level. For the
female sample, in the Eastern Black Sea, and the Northeastern and Southeastern Anatolian
regions, the coefficient of the interaction term was negative and significant, which indicates
that, relative to 2004, daughters whose father’s education was less than secondary level are
more likely to attend a local college nearby. These results support two complementary trends:
one is that the presence of a nearby college increase the likelihood of local attendance; the other
is that educational mobility is higher for females in some conservative regions. We call this
effect localization with respect to post-secondary education. We should note that the model is
simple and bears some biases so it requires improvement. One shortcoming concerns missing
observations since family members residing elsewhere are not counted in the surveys which
are address based. Consequently, children who are enrolled in a distant college were excluded
from the sample. As long as these observations are missing in both periods, we can assume
that the difference-in-difference structure of the model can minimize this bias. The second bias
concerns the use of paternal education level as a proxy for income effect.
Localization might also reflect compositional change, meaning that the share of less-
educated parents decreases relative to others at that region. Therefore, as a robustness check,
we focus on the year effect, taking the entire population as the sample. We estimate a modified
version of Equ. 1 above by constructing the difference-in-difference structure based on two
main variables: year and region effect. In this model, the interaction term captures the impact
of the expansion for 26 NUTS2 regions. Table 7, which summarizes in which regions localization
is more effective, shows that the proximity effect is not only limited to girls in poorer NUTS2
regions (19, 20, 21, 22 and 25), and that local male students have also benefited from this
availability. The regional classification roughly corresponds to NUTS1 regions in our previous
estimation.
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In the light of studies evaluating the social externalities of university graduates (for the US,
Moretti (2004) and for Turkey, Bakis et al. (2013)), we can speculate that this trend is likely change
economic dynamics within regions. Regional selection can also produce structural effects on
post-secondary education mobilization. Localization might slow down the regional mobility
of the region’s educated labor force, and may even help to develop a new kind of human
capital formation with stronger local attachments. However, given the low quality Erdog˘mus¸
and Esen (2016) and time needed to adapt, it is unlikely that these emerging universities will
sufficiently meet the conditions to develop a critical mass and boost the local dynamics of the
economy in the near future.
Generally, demand externalities may significantly affect individual regions suffering from
low levels of economic activity. In nearly half of the regions (13 out of 26), the ratio of
students enrolled in post-secondary education exceeded 6% of the working population (Table
5). Combined with distributive grants and a credit policy (Table 4), it would not be wrong to
argue that the local demand created by college students, together with other externalities such
as real estate and housing, local dynamics have contributed to local economies throughout the
JDP’s political tenure.
4 Regional Returns to Higher Education
There is an extensive literature on returns to education and wage structure, and factors acting
on wage inequality. US-based studies mainly discuss the role of technology and labor market
institutions. Despite an increase in the supply of workers with higher education, Acemoglu
(2000) argues that technical change has been a driving factor in the rise of skill returns. David
et al. (1997) provide evidence for skilled-biased technical change that favors the compensation
of more highly educated workers. Barth and Lucifora (2006) find no effect of supply shock
(higher education expansion) on the relative wage dispersion of skilled workers for 12 European
countries.
A number of studies, such as Bakis and Polat (2015), Bakis (2015) and Filiztekin (2015),
discuss the importance of wage income in the structural transition to paid or market labor
in Turkey. This net transition accounts for more than 10% of the labor force during the last
decade. Most of these workers are wage earners who have moved from locally defined jobs
such as self-employment or small scale family business to market ones. This observation gains
support from the fact that the previously locally defined network structure of cities has experi-
enced a structural change to become more complex, more integrated and less communitarian.
Comparing the year effect in both regressions (Table 6), we see that for locals, the probability
of attending post-secondary education has increased across all regions. There might be several
factors affecting the decision to attend college. One might be the incentive created by higher
marginal returns to post-secondary education. Another is the incentive to reside in, rather than
migrate from a region, which might reflect lower selective migration. If there is a tendency for
local marginal returns to higher education to equate across regions, the localization effect is
17
likely to persist, which justifies the college proximity argument. In order to account for these
trends, we estimate the simple Mincerian wage regression described in Equ. 2
ln(hw)i,t = β0 + β1Ei,t + β2Pi,t + β3Ti,t + i,t (2)
The sample for real hourly wage regressions is restricted to male wage earners aged 24-39 to
gain a sufficient number of observations and avoid selection bias emerging from participation
issues for women. In Equ. 2, P, T and S stand for potential experience, firm-specific tenure
and a public employee dummy respectively. Education E is taken as categorical and roughly
grouped into four levels.23 Table 8 summarizes the regression results given in Equ. 2 for each
region for pooled cross-sections of 2004-2005 and 2012-2013 data.
23Salehi-Isfahani et al. (2009) argues that individual returns to years of education show non-linearities for Turkey
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The last rows of Table 8 show marginal returns to post-secondary education with respect
to secondary24 and primary education level. Compared to the 2004-05 pooled regressions,
marginal returns to post-secondary relative to secondary education have increased in regions
where higher education has expanded, particularly in eastern provinces, although this does
not hold for primary education level for all regions. 25 For 1988, 1994 and 2003, Salehi-Isfahani
et al. (2009) show that marginal returns to graduating from post-secondary level with respect to
secondary level increased. They argue that the increasing trend of marginal returns despite the
expansion of education is related more with labor demand conditions and the sophistication of
the economic structure, since a similar expansion in Iran did not result in increased individual
returns.26 Higher returns to college might reflect technological changes which favor skilled
labor. Bakis and Polat (2015) also argue that it is rather structural change which implies
that between effects are larger across industries. Whatever the reason behind the higher
relative marginal returns, increased labor demand coupled with economic growth stimulate
attendance in higher education in Turkey’s eastern regions. Another interesting result is the
public-private differential (Table 8), whereby public employees earn more than private ones but
still the premium increases in less-developed regions. This implies that amenity differentials
are compensated for in the public sector. The fact that Istanbul has the highest marginal returns
to post-secondary education supports the claim that highly educated workers sort into more
developed regions, namely Istanbul , Turkey’s largest city. Related to our previous remarks on
localization, regional estimates show that, in terms of returns, there is a slow convergence over
time.
Several implications from these findings for female wage earners need to be emphasized.
It is evident that the expansion of education at every level increases female labor force partici-
pation for younger cohorts (Tansel (2001), (Dayıog˘lu and Kırdar, 2010)). For higher education,
this upward trend in female participation needs to be coupled with an expansion of public
sector jobs where gender selection is more likely. From a political economy perspective, there
are two implications. Firstly, the public sector, being a major employer in the field of education
and health, should grow to address the needs of mothers for childcare and elderly healthcare
in order to increase labor participation rates.27 Secondly, the political demand for gender-
specific job creation will increase with the additional supply of educated women that have
benefited mostly from the removal of restrictions on access to public work for women wearing
head-scarves and from localization in more conservative regions, as already discussed.
24Regular and vocational high schools are merged into one category in order to avoid confusion.
25Returns to secondary education level with respect to primary education level shows a relative decline in most
regions. This closing gap in returns needs further investigation.
26Salehi-Isfahani et al. (2009) find higher returns to education for 2003 with a sample including individuals aged
20-59 and estimations basically involving potential experience and education variables. Tansel and Bodur (2012)
report a decline in returns to education for 2002 compared to 1994, which they attributed to insufficient labor
demand due to the 2001 crisis.
27Bakis et al. (2013) report that increasing the college share of employment in regions promotes social returns to
education, particularly for women.
20
5 Conclusion
The creation of new universities, which was initiated as a political move targeting regional
development, emerged as a re-distributive policy reorienting public investment and funds
toward Turkey’s poorer eastern regions. This expansion, which has almost doubled enroll-
ment rates since 2004, has been accompanied by subsidy policies facilitating more education
grants and fee waivers, and heavy investment in public student accommodation. In terms
of regional development, the JDP’s expansion policy has affected local economies through
demand externality which, in some regions, doubled the share of enrolled students and chan-
neled more public investment and expenditure. These developments have also significantly
reduced gender differences in regional college enrollment rates. Besides these macro effects,
this study highlights several impacts of this expansion on labor market dynamics. First, our
results show that access to higher education increased in eastern and less-developed regions.
Second, comparing the periods before and after expansion, we find that college access has
increased with college proximity (localization effect) and this expansion led to a re-distributive
effect in favor girls with low paternal education backgrounds. In this respect, it seems that
new universities are helping to build human capital at the regional level in Turkey. Another
important finding of our study is the change in the structure of local wage earnings related to
the expansion. Despite the increase in the supply of college graduates at the regional level, the
local marginal returns to higher education have not decreased. Compared to the pre-expansion
period, wage regressions show that there is a slow convergence in terms of marginal returns
to higher education for the male sample. These findings imply that we need further study and
more data to better understand the impact of this expansion.
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